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Abstract 
This project investigates the relationship between guilt and moral compensation, or 
pursuing morally positive behavior following morally suspect behavior. Additionally, the 
current research seeks to examine whether interpersonal, relational motives or 
intrapersonal, self-focused motives drive this relationship. In Study 1, participants 
recalled a moral transgression or a neutral memory; they then rated their guilt and 
completed a compensatory monetary donation task (or vice versa). Guilt was lower after 
the compensatory task, particularly for participants who had recalled a transgression, 
suggesting that compensatory behavior can mitigate guilt. Pre-compensatory guilt also 
significantly predicted the decision to donate. Study 2 manipulated the anonymity of both 
the transgression and the compensatory opportunity in order to probe the interpersonal 
versus intrapersonal mechanisms of guilt and moral compensation. Guilt and donations 
were higher for known than unknown transgressions, but were unaffected by 
compensation anonymity, supporting both interpersonal and intrapersonal mechanisms. 
The link between transgression anonymity and donations was fully mediated by guilt, 
indicating that guilt motivates subsequent compensatory behavior. Together, the results 
of these studies illustrate that guilt affects and is affected by compensatory behavior. 
Further research may help clarify the mechanisms behind this relationship. 
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Guilt and Moral Compensation: Relational or Self-Presentational? 
One area of acute tension in human moral decision making is in the conflict 
between wanting to be moral and wanting to benefit from the advantages of acting 
selfishly or immorally. On the one hand, people often strive to be moral, as immoral 
behavior leads to a jeopardized self-image, judgment by others, and in some cases, 
punishment (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). Yet, on the other hand, immoral 
behavior—such as cheating, stealing, and acting selfishly—can lead to immediate reward 
(Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). The tension between these competing incentives can lead 
to moral inconsistency; people attempt to benefit from immoral behavior while 
maintaining a moral self-image, thus engaging in both kinds of behavior (Mazar, Amir, & 
Ariely, 2008).  
Two manifestations of this moral inconsistency are moral licensing and 
compensatory behavior. In the case of moral licensing, people feel licensed or entitled by 
previous moral behavior to do something immoral. Acting morally or even recalling 
previous moral behavior can license a variety of subsequent negative behaviors, including 
committing selfish acts, making questionable consumer choices, and acting on politically 
incorrect or racist intuitions (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010).  For example, if someone 
acts generously, they may be more likely to act selfishly later on, even if the context or 
situation is different. 
Such moral licensing effects have been demonstrated by several studies. Monin 
and Miller (2001) found that giving participants the opportunity to demonstrate lack of 
prejudice led to more prejudiced decisions later on. In one study, participants had an 
opportunity to disagree with blatantly sexist statements (e.g., ―Most women need a man 
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to protect them‖) or ambiguously sexist statements (e.g., ―Some women need a man to 
protect them‖), or they received no statements at all. Men who received the blatantly 
sexist statements—and thus, had the greatest opportunity to demonstrate their opposition 
to sexism—were subsequently more willing to favor hiring a man for a stereotypically 
male job than were men who received ambiguous statements or no statements. In this 
instance, the opportunity to disagree with sexist statements licensed making sexist 
decisions later on.  
Further demonstrating the moral licensing account, licensing behavior also 
emerges in domains that differ from those of the preceding moral behavior. For example, 
one study revealed that participants who recalled a past moral action indicated less 
likelihood of engaging in unrelated prosocial activities (e.g., donating blood, volunteering 
at a homeless shelter, etc.) than those who recalled a past immoral or neutral action 
(Jordan, Mullen, & Murninghan, 2011). Thus, moral licensing is a robust phenomenon, 
occurring even when the original licensing behavior has nothing to do with the 
subsequent immoral behavior. It is important to note, however, that while people may be 
motivated to act immorally or to compensate as a result of recalling past actions, this 
motivation may not be conscious. For example, Khan and Dhar (2006) found that 
participants who were licensed failed to recognize this licensing effect. Students 
committed to helping a classmate subsequently donated less money to charity than those 
who were not given a licensing opportunity. However, when asked to justify their 
donation choice, participants did not identify that the prior task impacted the amount they 
chose to donate.  
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This subconsciously driven moral inconsistency is also evident in the form of 
compensatory behavior (DeCremer, 2009). Compensatory behavior occurs in instances 
where the pursuit of immoral behavior motivates the pursuit of positive behavior.  In 
these cases, people pursue moral behavior following morally suspect behavior as if to 
compensate for their moral transgression. Like licensing, compensatory behavior is a 
well-established phenomenon that occurs in a variety of contexts. For example, Jordan et 
al. (2011) found that participants who recalled their own previous immoral behavior 
cheated less in a computer task than those who recalled their own moral behavior. 
Furthermore, those who recalled their own previous immoral behavior showed more 
persistence with the task—i.e., answered more questions before beginning to cheat—than 
did those recalling their own moral behavior.  
Research conducted by Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) augments the literature on 
compensatory behavior by indicating that compensatory behavior can indirectly manifest 
itself in a decreased desire for physical cleansing, which symbolizes moral purification. 
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006), who examined the relationship between threatened 
morality and physical cleansing, found that people who recalled immoral acts had a 
greater desire for physical cleanliness, which can function as a surrogate for moral 
purification. Those who recalled their own immoral acts recalled more cleanliness-related 
words as compared to those who recalled neutral or moral acts.  Additionally, participants 
who copied a story about an immoral act showed a greater preference for cleaning 
products than those who recalled moral acts. These tendencies are indicative of this 
overall desire to compensate or fix a past transgression, as according to compensatory 
behavior.  
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Guilt and Moral Compensation 
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) also found that compensatory behavior might 
regulate the experience of negative emotions such as guilt and shame. Their findings 
showed that engaging in physical cleansing (a form of moral purification) after recalling 
or reading about an immoral act not only reduced participants‘ willingness to volunteer 
but also their moral emotions, including guilt and shame. Furthermore, while the 
compensatory act of hand washing reduced moral emotions, it did not influence non-
moral emotions, suggesting a unique relationship between compensatory behavior and 
specifically moral emotions. In particular, the reduction of guilt through physical 
cleansing after the recollection of an immoral act suggests that compensatory behavior 
may reduce guilt. Additionally, the fact that moral emotions and the desire to volunteer 
were both reduced by moral cleansing suggests that the mechanisms motivating these 
changes might be similar.  
These findings are indicative of the larger role that emotions play in moral 
decision making. Moral emotions link internal standards and moral intuitions to 
subsequent behaviors (Ghorbani, Liao, Çayköylü, & Chand, 2013, Greene & Haidt, 
2002); neuroimaging studies, as well as studies of individuals with brain damage, show 
that emotion and affective intuition are primary drivers of moral judgment (Greene, 
2008). For example, Greene (2008) found that classically cognitive brain areas (e.g., the 
anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and classically emotion-related areas (e.g., the 
amygdala) are both activated when people consider moral dilemma cases. While all 
emotions provide a motivational tendency, particular emotions, such as anger, shame, and 
guilt are especially relevant to moral behavior (Greene & Haidt, 2002). Such moral 
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emotions may moderate the link between moral standards and moral decisions, ultimately 
affecting moral behavior.  
These individual emotions elicit specific motivations, serving different emotional 
functions (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). Anger, for example, plays a role in morally 
inconsistent behavior in that it causes people to judge others more harshly while 
simultaneously relaxing judgment of themselves (Hemenover & Zhang, 2004). For 
example, a study conducted by Polman and Ruttan (2012) found that when participants 
who recalled an experience that made them angry were given the opportunity to allocate 
money to cancer research, they donated less money than participants in the neutral 
condition and urged others to donate more money than those in the neutral condition. 
Thus, angry people showed a decrease in their own moral behavior while expecting 
others to act more prosocially than themselves. 
Conversely, emotions such as guilt and shame have been found to function as 
self-conscious emotions, raising awareness of one‘s own transgressions (Tangney, 
Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Much of the research focused on distinguishing shame from 
guilt indicates overlap between these emotions. For example, analyses of personal shame 
and guilt experiences recalled by adults and children revealed little difference between 
the types of events that elicit shame and guilt (Tangney, Steuwig, & Mashek, 2007). 
Furthermore, empirical research has shown that shame and guilt are equally likely to be 
experienced in the presence of others. These emotions do differ, however, in the role of 
the self in these experiences and in their utility in motivating reparative behavior 
(Tangney, 1995). While shame emphasizes the self (i.e., in thinking, ―I am a bad 
person.‖), guilt usually relates to a specific behavior (i.e. in thinking, ―I did a bad 
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thing.‖). In this way, shame motivates a hyper-focusing on the self that makes one less 
likely to focus on repairing the hurt or pain caused to another person; guilt, on the other 
hand, sparks other-oriented empathy, driving restorative actions (Tangney, 1995). In 
addition, proneness to shame is correlated with proneness to feelings of outwardly 
directed anger and hostility, while guilt is not; a study of young adults showed that the 
tendency to experience shame was significantly positively correlated with measures of 
trait anger, while proneness to guilt was negatively or negligibly correlated with anger 
and hostility (Tangney, 1995).  
These findings suggest that guilt may play a unique role as an emotional 
motivator of compensatory behavior. Compensatory behavior is driven by a desire to 
make up for past transgressions (Ghorbani, M., Liao, Y., Çayköylü, S., & Chand, M., 
2013). Guilt can serve as a signifier for these moral violations, motivating reparative 
behavior (Eisenberg, 2000; Haidt, 2003). Yet, anger allows people to maintain a high 
sense of moral self-worth, creating entitlement to transgress, and shame is correlated with 
trait anger and fails to motivate compensatory action (Polman and Ruttan, 2012; 
Tangney, 1995).  
Past research examining the role of guilt in cooperation further indicates that guilt 
can play a role in compensatory behavior (Ketaleer & Au, 2003). Ketaleer and Au (2003) 
found that feelings of guilt can spark cooperation in a social bargaining game. In their 
study, participants who reported guilty feelings after making selfish offers in an 
ultimatum game were more likely to act cooperatively and make generous offers when 
re-playing the game up to a week later.  In contrast, those who did not report initially 
feeling guilty continued to pursue selfish strategies a week later. This difference in action 
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based on guilt feelings seems to show that when guilt arises, it motivates positive 
behavior. Such findings are suggestive of a relationship between guilt and compensatory 
behavior, whereby guilt provides motivation to compensate for past misdeeds.  
Other evidence further supports the connection between guilt and compensatory 
behavior by indicating that guilt plays a role in motivating compensatory behavior on 
behalf of in-group members. In a study by Gino, Zu, and Zhong (2009), participants 
observed an in-group member (a confederate in a UNC shirt, the school that all 
participants attended) or an out-group member (a confederate in a Duke shirt, a rival 
school) act selfishly in a dictator game in the presence of an out-group member (another 
confederate in a Duke shirt). Participants were instructed that they were each partnered 
with someone in the other room (a room in which, in reality, students were completing an 
entirely different study) and that they had $10 to decide (without any input from their 
partner) to allocate between themselves and their partner. Individuals were told that they 
could offer their partner any portion of the $10, from nothing to the entire amount.  Those 
in the in-group selfish condition left more money for their partner than those in the out-
group selfish condition, as if to compensate on their in-group member‘s behalf. In a 
follow-up study examining the mechanism behind participants‘ restitutional acts, Gino et 
al. (2009) found that participants who were asked to imagine viewing the selfish behavior 
of an in-group member reported feeling more guilty about the person‘s selfish behavior 
than the participants in the out-group selfish condition. Furthermore, self-reported guilt 
by the participant was a predictor of the amount of money a participant chose to donate.  
The fact that guilt was associated with the magnitude of participants‘ donations clearly 
implicates guilt as a motivating factor in compensatory behavior. 
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Mechanisms Motivating Guilt and Compensation 
Gino, Zu, and Zhong‘s (2009) findings in combination with Ketaleer and Au‘s 
(2003) evidence demonstrates that guilt impacts compensatory behavior. These studies 
indicate that guilt can motivate compensatory cooperation and prosocial behavior after 
committing morally suspect behavior or after observing an in-group member acting 
selfishly. However, what is unclear is how and why this relationship exists. 
Although the existing literature implies that guilt motivates compensatory 
behavior, the mechanisms behind this motivation have not been investigated. In what 
specific contexts are guilt and compensatory behavior linked, and what do these differing 
contexts tell us about when and why guilt leads to compensatory behavior? Are there 
specific contexts in which this relationship does not hold? As a result of this scant data, 
potential contextual restrictions or limitations to this relationship are unclear.  
Additionally, the current research focuses primarily on how guilt might motivate 
compensatory behavior and there has been little research on how compensatory behavior 
affects guilt. While the fact that guilt motivates compensatory behavior suggests that 
compensatory behavior might subsequently affect guilt, this directionality of the guilt and 
compensatory behavior relationship has not been tested or confirmed.  
In order to fully understand the relationship between guilt and compensatory 
behavior, it is important to more closely examine the theoretical explanations for each 
phenomenon. Ongoing debates over the mechanisms that drive both guilt and 
compensatory behavior focus on two broad potential mechanisms: one that is relational 
(i.e., driven by interpersonal motivations) and one that is self-presentational (i.e., driven 
by intrapersonal motivations). Both of these perspectives suggest that guilt and 
Guilt and Moral Compensation                   11 
 
compensatory behavior allow for the regulation of moral and immoral behavior such that 
one can accrue the benefits of acting morally while avoiding penalties for transgressions. 
However, these perspectives differ in what they identify as the potential penalties for 
transgressions committed without compensation. The interpersonal perspective identifies 
that acting immorally can negatively affect someone by causing them to be viewed as 
immoral by others or by negatively impacting their relationships with others. In contrast, 
the intrapersonal perspective holds that immorality can lead to a compromised sense of 
self-worth or a damaged self-image.  
Interpersonal Compensatory Behavior 
According to one view, moral behaviors are driven by our desire to preserve 
relationships and to be seen positively by others. This perspective holds that status 
promotion, which occurs when others publicly view one‘s moral behavior, is the primary 
motivator for moral actions. Thus, such a perspective can be considered an interpersonal 
theory of moral behavior. Evidence for this theory comes from the fact that individuals 
behave the most morally when in the presence or imagined presence of others (Bateson, 
Nettle, & Roberts, 2006). Public contexts not only heighten morality, but can even 
prevent moral licensing from occurring. In the context of compensatory behavior, this 
manifests itself as a desire to retain a good reputation by making up for past 
transgressions. 
A study conducted by Greene and Low (2014) demonstrated the interpersonal 
nature of moral behavior by examining the effect of recalling past behavior on 
evaluations of hypothetical moral transgressions in public and private settings. Greene 
and Low (2014) looked specifically at moral licensing, but their findings connote how 
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interpersonal mechanisms may work in the context of compensatory behavior. In the 
experiment, individuals showed a typical licensing effect, whereby they reported being 
more likely to transgress, and they viewed transgressions as more permissible, after 
recalling past moral behavior. However, this licensing effect disappeared when the 
transgressive behavior was conducted in public. In other words, the presence of others 
and the opinion of others is so important that it can cause one to refrain from acting 
licensed in the first place. This finding suggests that the public or private context of a 
transgression can make a difference such that public transgressions are more detrimental, 
as the opinion of others is of the utmost importance.  If public awareness of a 
transgression increases its salience—to a point where moral licensing no longer even 
occurs—then it suggests that relationships and reputation are of utmost importance in 
moral decision making. A similar relational perspective may likewise explain 
compensatory behavior; compensatory behavior could be fueled by this heightened 
awareness of moral transgression in a situation where an outside party was affected or 
observed the initial moral transgression. According to this view, people engage in 
compensatory behavior to reduce a negative reputation, rather than to preserve their own 
self-worth. 
Intrapersonal Compensatory Behavior 
While interpersonal theory claims that a desire to preserve relationships and 
public reputation drives moral behavior, intrapersonal theory holds that moral behavior is 
driven by a desire to preserve one‘s own self-image. According to this theory, people 
compensate in order to restore their own self-image, which is constructed based on 
perceptions of one‘s own morality (Dunning, 2007). In the context of compensatory 
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behavior, intrapersonal theory holds that an initial immoral action compromises a 
person‘s self–worth, subsequently motivating them to pursue self-restorative moral 
action.  
A study conducted by Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009) demonstrates that 
compensatory behavior may indeed be driven by intrapersonal mechanisms. Participants 
were asked to write a short story about themselves or about someone they knew using 
either negative or positive trait words. After completing the written task, participants had 
the opportunity to donate part of their compensation to charity. Among participants who 
wrote a story about someone they knew, donation behavior did not differ depending on 
the trait words used in the story (negative vs. positive). However, participants who wrote 
a self-relevant story about their own negative traits donated five times as much as those 
who wrote a self-relevant story about their own positive traits. Thus, donation behavior 
was specifically influenced by reflection on one‘s own traits, with negative reflection 
creating the greatest need to compensate. The absence of a compensatory effect when 
participants wrote about others implies something other than interpersonal mechanisms at 
work. While interpersonal theory would suggest that writing negatively about others 
might induce a need to compensate—given the relational implications of writing 
negatively about someone—this was not the case. Rather, it was self-image, and thus 
intrapersonal factors, that fueled compensatory behavior.  
Intrapersonal Guilt 
In a similar fashion, intrapersonal theory proposes that guilt drives subsequent 
actions that can restore one‘s self-worth. This theory, like the interpersonal theory, still 
maintains that guilt is a reparative moral emotion. However, the intrapersonal account 
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suggests that guilt drives any reparative action that will make one feel better about 
oneself, not just actions that will repair one‘s relationship with others. Consistent with 
this notion, a series of studies by de Hooge (2012) demonstrate that even when a 
transgressor‘s damage is repaired by someone else, the transgressor‘s guilty feelings, 
reparative intentions, and prosocial behavior diminish. 
  In all five experiments, participants read about transgressing someone (e.g., 
borrowing someone‘s bike without permission and having it stolen) and were then asked 
about their own prosocial behavior and repair motivation (e.g., how much money they 
would spend on a birthday present for the person they transgressed). Participants read 
about restoring the transgression themselves, having a third party restore their 
transgression (e.g., by finding the original stolen bike), or not having the transgression 
restored at all. de Hooge (2012) found that guilt, repair motivation, and prosocial 
behavior were equally low when the transgression was restored, regardless of whether it 
was restored by oneself or by a third party. If guilt serves an interpersonal function, then 
repair motivations should have remained high when a third party repaired the 
transgression. Given that, in contrast, repair motivations decreased when someone else 
did the repairing, it seems that preserving the relationship is not as crucial as the overall 
alleviation of guilty feelings. Thus, de Hooge‘s (2012) data supports the intrapersonal 
theory of guilt—that guilt motivates us to repair our own self-worth.  
Interpersonal Guilt 
The intrapersonal account of guilt is complicated, however, by other evidence that 
supports interpersonal mechanisms. According to the interpersonal theory of guilt, guilt is 
intended to preserve relationships and motivates us to act in order to preserve these 
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relationships. Guilt—along with shame, embarrassment, and pride—is seen as a self-
conscious emotion elicited by others‘ negative moral judgments (Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2006).  
According to Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994), guilt serves to 
reinforce social bonds and is strongest and most common when one transgresses against 
relationship partners.  Autobiographical accounts support such an interpersonal function 
of guilt. In one study, for example, participants who were asked to provide 
autobiographical accounts of times when they felt guilty almost solely described 
interpersonal incidents, with very few accounts referring to solitary transgressions 
(Tangney, 1992). In another study, participants who wrote a story about feeling guilty 
were more likely to convey high regard or esteem for the victim, as compared to those 
who wrote about not feeling guilty (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995). 
Additionally, communal relationships—such as those with family members or romantic 
partners—were more commonly discussed in the guilty stories than in the neutral stories. 
These repeated references to close relationships imply that guilt is interpersonal in nature, 
arising in relational contexts. Furthermore, those recounting guilty stories were more 
likely to report apologizing or making an effort to reconcile with the victim, thus 
illustrating that guilt is generally intended to fuel reparative actions.  
Connections between Guilt and Compensatory Behavior 
Considering that guilt motivates reconciliation and reparative action, it is possible 
that guilt can specifically motivate compensatory behavior (Haidt, 2003). Guilt is 
implicated in compensatory contexts as an emotional motivator, leading to greater 
cooperation and greater likelihood to compensate on behalf of a group member (Ketaleer 
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& Au, 2003; Gino, Zu, and Zhong, 2009). However, there is a gap in the literature with 
regards to the directionality of this potential relationship. Past research has not explicitly 
investigated if guilt affects and drives compensatory behavior, if compensatory behavior 
affects or mitigates guilt, or if both effects occur. Previous research has mostly looked at 
correlational data, examining guilt either before or after compensatory tasks, rather than 
comparing how guilt may change over time. 
 Furthermore, the mechanisms behind guilt and compensatory behavior, which 
hint at a relationship between the two, are debated. Research on both guilt and 
compensatory behavior have yielded conflicting views about whether each of these 
phenomena is driven by a desire to preserve relationships or a desire to preserve one‘s 
own self-image. While some data suggests that guilt occurs overwhelmingly in contexts 
where close relationships are violated (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994) , other 
data suggests that repair motivations decrease when someone else repairs for you, 
indicating that preserving one‘s self-image, not one‘s relationships is most important (de 
Hooge, 2012). Similarly, in some cases, compensatory behavior has been shown to 
increase in the presence of others (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006), while in other 
cases, it appears to occur primarily when self-reflection leads to a compromise in one‘s 
self-worth (Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009).  
Given these conflicting mechanistic accounts and the lack of research regarding 
the ways in which compensatory behavior and guilt may affect each other, it is unclear 
how exactly guilt and compensatory behavior are related, and whether interpersonal or 
intrapersonal factors may be driving this relationship. The present research seeks to 
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answer these questions, elucidating how guilt affects and is affected by compensatory 
behavior, and what mechanisms are behind this relationship. 
In Study 1, the basic relationship between compensatory behavior and guilt was 
explored using a memory recall manipulation and a compensatory task. Participants were 
asked to recall either a moral transgression or a neutral experience, and they subsequently 
had an opportunity to donate a portion of bonus money to charity. Participants reported 
their level of guilt either before completing this compensatory task (pre-compensatory) or 
afterward (post-compensatory). Examining the difference in guilt across these conditions 
has the potential to shed light on the way in which guilt both affects and is affected by 
compensatory behavior.  In particular, if guilt plays a role in compensatory behavior, then 
thinking about a past moral transgression should lead to larger donations then recalling a 
neutral event, and this pattern should be mediated by reported guilt. Additionally, if 
compensatory behavior reduces the experience of guilt, then post-compensatory guilt 
should be weaker than pre-compensatory guilt. 
If guilt and compensatory behavior are related to each other, then the question 
remains as to what forces drive this relationship. Study 2 will seek to answer this question 
by looking more closely at the interpersonal and intrapersonal mechanisms that 
potentially drive guilt and compensatory behavior.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. 328 participants (201 males, 126 females, and 1 transgender 
person) ages 18-63 (M=30, Mdn=28) completed the study via Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
a crowdsourcing internet marketplace in which people participate in online tasks in 
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exchange for monetary compensation. Participation was restricted to residents of the 
United States. All participants received $.35 for their participation; they could receive up 
to an additional $.20 as a bonus during the compensatory task. 
Design. A 2 (order: pre-compensatory vs. post-compensatory) x 2 (recall: 
transgression vs. neutral) between-subjects design was used in which participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four between-subjects conditions and subsequently had an 
opportunity to engage in compensatory behavior in the form of donating money. The 
order variable manipulated whether guilt was assessed before the compensatory task (pre-
compensatory) or after the compensatory task (post-compensatory). 
Materials. The initial distractor task contained four questions about probability 
and was adapted from Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer (2001). (See Appendix A for 
questions).   
Guilt was manipulated by asking participants either to recall an experience in 
which they made someone angry and felt bad afterwards (transgression) or to recount 
their typical Tuesday (neutral) as modeled after Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 
(1994), and Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan (2011), respectively.  (See Appendix B for 
full prompts).  
 Guilt was assessed with a modified version of the Momentary Emotional States 
Measure (Peeters et al., 2008). Participants were asked ―How do you feel right now?‖, 
followed by a series of emotions evaluated with a 7-point scale, ranging from ―not at all‖ 
to ―very.‖ The scale included a mix of eight positive and negative emotions taken from 
Peeters et al.‘s (2008) original set of 16. (See Appendix C for modified Momentary 
Emotional States Measure).  Although guilt was the only relevant emotion, the other 
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seven emotions were included to mask the primary aim of assessing guilt.  
 As modeled after Sachdeva et al. (2009), compensatory behavior was assessed as 
the amount of a small bonus ($.20) that participants decided to donate to charity.  
Procedure. All participants completed the study via Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Each participant provided consent and was assured that their data would be recorded 
anonymously. All questions were optional so as to ensure that a participant could opt out 
of a given question or the entire experiment at any time. To prevent demand 
characteristics, participants were informed that the study was examining the relationship 
between numerical literacy and memory recall.  
 All participants first completed four probability problems, which served to 
reinforce the false premise of the study. There was a three minute time limit for this task.  
Following this task, participants were randomly assigned to one of two recall 
conditions. Participants in the transgression condition recalled and wrote about an 
experience in which they made someone angry and felt bad afterwards; those in the 
neutral condition recalled and wrote about their typical Tuesday. Both groups spent three 
minutes on the recall task, after which they completed both the emotion questionnaire and 
the compensatory task. In the compensatory task, participants received a 20 cent bonus 
for their participation and had the option to donate any amount of the bonus to the 
American Cancer Society.  
Half of the participants in each recall condition completed the emotion 
questionnaire first and then the compensatory task (pre-compensatory) and the other half 
completed these tasks in the opposite order (post-compensatory). 
Results 
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A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA examined whether guilt differed as a function 
of recall (transgression vs. neutral), order (pre-compensatory vs. post-compensatory), and 
their interaction.  There was a main effect of recall, such that guilt was greater in the 
transgression condition (M =3.24, SD =2.05) than the neutral condition (M = 1.70, SD = 
1.27), F (1, 326) = 19.03 p<.001, η2=.190. There was also a main effect of order, such 
that guilt was higher before the compensatory task (pre-compensatory M=2.76, SD=2.05) 
than afterward (post-compensatory M=2.13, SD=1.58), F (1, 326) = 15.44 p<.001, 
η2=.046. The recall x order interaction was significant, F(1, 326) =19.03 p<.001, η2=.056, 
revealing that difference between pre- and post-compensatory guilt was far greater in the 
transgression condition than the neutral condition (see Figure 1).  
Examination of compensation showed that the distribution was non-normal. 
Although participants could select any option between 0 and 20 cents (via a sliding bar), 
98% of responses were either 0 or multiples of 5; over half of the responses were 0. 
Because of this unusual distribution, compensatory responses were re-coded into two new 
variables. The donation decision variable simply represented whether participants chose 
to donate nothing (i.e., 0 cents) or something (i.e., any amount from 1 to 20 cents). The 
donation amount variable represented the magnitude of donation decisions; given that 
nearly all donations were made in multiples of 5, donations of 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 cents 
were re-coded as values of 0-4, respectively (any original donations that were not 
multiples of 5 were rounded up).  
A logistic regression predicting decision to donate by condition showed a 
significant effect of condition (Wald=5.25, p<.05) such that people decided to donate 
more often in the transgression condition (43%) than in the neutral condition (30%). 
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However, condition did not significantly predict donation amount (F(1, 325)=2.25, 
p=.135, µ=.007). This inconsistency across ways of assessing donations seems to be 
explained by the fact that among people who did donate, donations were descriptively, 
although non-significantly, higher in the neutral condition (M=2.15, SD=1.00) than in the 
transgression condition (M=1.99, SD=.97), p>.1.  
Pre-compensatory guilt was a significant predictor of donation decision 
(Wald=6.45, p<.05) indicating that higher ratings of guilt were associated with a greater 
inclination to donate.  A linear regression analysis revealed that pre-compensatory guilt 
was likewise a marginally significant predictor of donation amount (ß=.14, t(162) = 1.78, 
p = .077). 
Although Study 1 was concerned specifically with guilt, participants were also 
asked to report how energetic, anxious, happy, distractible, irritated, talkative, and tense 
they felt before or after completing the compensatory task. Separate ANOVAs examining 
these pre-compensatory emotions revealed that anxiety, happiness, irritation, and 
tenseness differed significantly by condition (All Fs>4.33, all ps<.039). However, none 
of these emotions significantly predicted either donation decision (all rs<.057) or 
donation amount (all rs<.051). Additionally, donation decision and donation amount 
were not significantly correlated with any post-compensatory emotions (All rs<.114 and 
all rs<.099, respectively).   
Discussion 
This initial study sought to examine the relationship between guilt and 
compensatory behavior. More specifically, by looking at guilt before and after 
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compensation, Study 1 sought to determine how guilt both affects and is affected by 
compensatory behavior.  
 People who recalled a time when they angered someone felt guiltier than those 
who recalled a neutral experience. This finding is consistent with previous research, 
which suggests that recalling experiences of angering or hurting someone can trigger 
guilt (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994).  
 As expected, pre-compensatory guilt was lower than post compensatory guilt, 
indicating that compensatory behavior can reduce the experience of guilt. Guilt was 
mitigated by compensation more in the transgression condition than in the neutral 
condition, indicating that this relationship between guilt and compensatory behavior 
might have limiting conditions. In the neutral condition, pre-compensatory guilt was 
already very low. It is possible that participants‘ guilt in this condition was so low that it 
could not be decreased any further. Alternately, it is possible that the ―baseline‖ guilt that 
someone feels in their everyday life—rather than guilt explicitly related to a specific 
experience—cannot be mitigated or otherwise affected by compensatory behavior.  
 Although those in the transgression condition decided to donate more often than 
those in the neutral condition, donation amounts were only marginally predicted by guilt. 
This finding may be explained by the nature of compensatory behavior. Compensatory 
behavior is intended to allow one to benefit from immoral behavior (e.g., .keeping money 
for oneself rather than donating it), while maintaining a moral self-image (e.g., alleviating 
the guilt of acting immorally) (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Therefore, if the mere act 
of donating is enough to alleviate guilt, then guilt may only drive someone to perform 
this minimal compensation. According to this principle, in the context of the present 
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experiment, a person would be expected to donate the smallest amount possible to 
achieve compensation. If, for example, donating less than five cents is effective at 
alleviating guilt, people may donate up to five cents and nothing more. In doing so, the 
person benefits by not only decreasing their guilt but also by keeping most of the bonus. 
Thus, this finding may be indicative of the way in which guilt and compensatory 
behavior are related; guilt may drive someone to compensate, but only enough to resolve 
the guilt. 
 The results of Study 1 suggest a relationship between guilt and compensatory 
behavior, but do not provide concrete evidence as to the extent of or foundation for this 
relationship. In particular, Study 1 was limited in its ability to determine the mechanisms 
behind guilt and compensatory behavior; guilt and compensatory behavior were only 
evaluated in an interpersonal context as all participants in the transgression condition 
were asked to recall a time when their actions affected someone else. Study 2 seeks to 
remedy this by comparing guilt and compensatory behavior across interpersonal and 
intrapersonal contexts.  
Study 2 
Study 1 provided evidence for a relationship between guilt and compensatory 
behavior, suggesting that transgressing can lead to guilt, and that the subsequent 
compensatory behavior can assuage this guilt. These findings reveal that guilt both 
affects, and is affected by, compensatory behavior.  The question, however, of what 
drives this relationship remains unanswered. As described earlier, it is unclear whether 
guilt and compensatory behavior are driven primarily by interpersonal or intrapersonal 
motivations. While interpersonal motivations include the desire to be perceived morally 
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by others and to preserve relationships, intrapersonal motivations include wanting to 
preserve one‘s own self-image and self-worth.   
Study 2 therefore seeks to more closely examine these mechanisms, aiming to 
distinguish between the interpersonal and intrapersonal accounts.  
According to the interpersonal theory of compensatory behavior, status promotion 
is the primary motivator for moral actions and occurs when one‘s morality is publicly 
viewed (Greene & Low, 2014). This theory suggests that public knowledge of one‘s 
actions is particularly important, as the opinion of others is the primary concern. This 
account would predict that transgressors who act immorally in public or with the 
knowledge of others should fuel a stronger desire to compensate than those who act 
immorally in a private setting. Furthermore, public transgressions should fuel more guilt 
than private transgressions, potentially contributing to this greater desire to compensate. 
 In contrast, the intrapersonal theory holds that public knowledge is irrelevant, as 
the motivator for acting morally after committing a transgression is to restore one‘s own 
self-worth. Thus, according to the intrapersonal theory, the public nature of a 
transgression should make no difference in either the level or guilt or the desire to 
compensate.  
Study 2 relies on this public versus private distinction in order to examine the 
interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of compensatory behavior. In this study, 
participants‘ compensatory donation behavior was either publicly disclosed (published in 
an organization‘s newsletter) or it was anonymous (published in the newsletter without 
donor information). If compensatory behavior is primarily driven interpersonally, then 
participants should donate more in the disclosed condition than in the anonymous 
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condition. However, if compensatory behavior is driven intrapersonally, then the 
anonymity of donations should not affect people‘s desire to donate. 
To look more closely at the interpersonal vs. intrapersonal nature of guilt, Study 2 
also manipulates the anonymity of the transgression itself. Participants read a scenario in 
which their transgression would be known, or in which it would be unknown. According 
to interpersonal theory, guilt is intended to preserve relationships and is inspired by a 
self-consciousness derived from the judgment of others. If guilt is primarily driven by the 
judgment of others, then a known transgression should elicit more guilt than an unknown 
transgression. Alternately, the intrapersonal theory predicts that the anonymity of a 
transgression should not affect guilt levels.   
As in Study 1, Study 2 also varies whether participants reported their guilt before 
completing the compensatory task (pre-compensatory) or afterward (post-compensatory).  
Thus, the interpersonal theory—but not the intrapersonal theory—predicts that the 
anonymity of both the compensation and the transgression will affect guilt and 
compensatory behavior, but in a nuanced way.  In particular, the effect of compensation 
anonymity should depend on the transgression anonymity; whereas unknown 
transgressions should elicit similar donation behavior regardless of whether the 
compensation occurs anonymously versus publicly, known transgressions should elicit 
greater donations when public than when anonymous. In other words, the interpersonal 
theory predicts an interaction between compensation anonymity and transgression 
anonymity, such that known transgressions would lead to more donations than unknown 
transgressions and that disclosed donations would be more effective than anonymous 
donations in addressing this desire to compensate, particularly for known transgressions. 
Guilt and Moral Compensation                   26 
 
 A similar interaction should likewise emerge for ratings of guilt, such that guilt 
should show greater mitigation from public donation than from anonymous donation, 
particularly for known transgressions.  
Overall, then, the interpersonal theory predicts that both guilt and compensatory 
behavior will be higher for initial transgressions that are known rather than unknown.  
Given the role of guilt in driving compensatory behavior—as established by Study 1—
Study 2 will test a mediational model of this relationship. This model assesses whether 
the relationship between transgression anonymity and compensatory behavior is mediated 
by feelings of guilt. If found, a mediation effect would demonstrate that guilt affects 
compensatory behavior. 
Method 
Participants. 496 participants (317 males, 177 females, and 2 gender-
nonconforming or undisclosed gender participants) ages 18-74 (M=31, Mdn=28) were 
recruited for this study via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participation was limited to 
residents of the United States. All participants received $.35 for their participation.  
Design. A 2 (transgression: known vs. unknown) x 2 (compensation: known vs. 
anonymous) x 2 (order: pre-compensatory vs. post-compensatory) between-subjects 
design was used in which participants were randomly assigned to one of eight between-
subjects conditions.  
Materials. All participants imagined themselves as the actor in a scenario in 
which they volunteer for a non-profit organization and accidentally delete some of the 
organization‘s important and irreplaceable data. In the known transgression condition, 
participants learned that they would be directly implicated as the transgressor (the 
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supervisor was the only other person with access to the deleted data). In the unknown 
transgression condition, participants learned that they would not be identifiable as the 
transgressor (since many others had access to the deleted data; see Appendix D for the 
complete scenarios).    
 In the compensatory task, participants had an opportunity to compensate for their 
mistake by donating a portion of a recently received $200 bonus back to the organization. 
Participants selected one of seven specified monetary amounts ($0, $5, $10, $20, $50, 
$100, $200) to donate.  In the known compensation condition, participants learned that all 
donations are disclosed and published with the donor‘s name in the organization‘s 
monthly newsletter. In the anonymous compensation condition, participants learned that 
all donations are published anonymously in the monthly newsletter (See Appendix E for 
compensatory task). 
 Guilt was assessed, along with seven other emotions, in the same manner as in 
Study 1. 
Procedure. All participants completed the study via Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Each participant provided consent and was assured that their data would be recorded 
anonymously. All questions were optional so as to ensure that a participant could opt out 
of a given question or the entire experiment at any time.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to either the known or unknown 
transgression condition. They were instructed to read the scenario carefully and to 
imagine themselves in the situation. After reading the scenario, participants completed 
both the emotion questionnaire and the compensatory task; in the latter task, participants 
were randomly assigned to have an opportunity for known vs. anonymous compensation. 
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Half of the participants in each transgression condition completed the emotion 
questionnaire before the compensatory task (pre-compensatory), while the other half 
completed these tasks in the reverse order (post-compensatory). 
Results 
 Donation (the measure of compensatory behavior) statistics and analyses were 
conducted using an interval scale. Initial donation data was collected on an ordinal scale. 
However, participants‘ responses were treated as respective monetary values (e.g., $0, $5, 
$10) rather than as the original ordinal scale values (e.g., 1, 2, 3). 
A 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA examined whether guilt differed as a 
function of transgression (known vs. unknown), compensation (known vs. anonymous), 
order (pre-compensatory vs. post-compensatory), and their interactions.  There was a 
main effect of transgression such that guilt was greater in the known transgression 
condition (M =5.29, SD =2.29) than the unknown transgression condition (M = 4.83, SD 
= 2.38), F (1, 486) = 6.07, p <.05, η2=.012 (see Figure 2). Additionally, there was a main 
effect of order by which pre-compensatory guilt (M= 5.67, SD=2.06) was greater than 
post-compensatory guilt (M= 4.44, SD=2.45), F(1, 486)=38.30, p<.001, η2=.073. There 
was no main effect of compensatory task; guilt did not differ as a function of whether the 
compensation was known (M =5.16 , SD =2.30) or unknown (M =4.96, SD =2.38), 
F(1,486)<1.0.  Moreover, there were no significant interactions (All Fs<2.02, all ps>.15).  
A 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA was also conducted to examine compensatory 
behavior, as measured in money donated. This analysis specifically explored whether 
donations differed as a function of transgression condition (known vs. unknown) and 
compensatory task condition (known vs. anonymous) as well as their interaction.  There 
Guilt and Moral Compensation                   29 
 
was a main effect of transgression such that donations were higher for known 
transgressions (M =116.91, SD =90.55) than unknown transgressions (M = 85.84, SD = 
85.4), F (1, 494) = 15.19, p<.001, η2=.030 (see Figure 3). As with the guilt analyses, 
there was no main effect of compensatory task condition, F(1, 494)=.158, p=.691, 
η2=.000 nor was there a transgression x compensation interaction, F (1,494)=.742, 
p>.389, η2=.002.  
Thus, transgression predicted both donation and guilt. Furthermore, pre-
compensatory guilt was correlated with donation, indicating that the more guilt someone 
felt, the larger their subsequent donation (r(243)=.303, p<.001). Because all three 
conditions held, a mediation analysis examined whether pre-compensatory guilt mediated 
the relationship between transgression and donation. Only pre-compensatory guilt was 
examined, given that the analysis was concerned with assessing whether guilt affects 
subsequent donations.  
Running a mediation model with a 95 percent confidence interval and 10,000 
bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2013) showed that there was a significant indirect effect of 
transgression influencing donation by virtue of pre-compensatory guilt (p<.05, z=-2.38). 
Furthermore, when the mediating effect of pre-compensatory guilt was accounted for, the 
link between transgression and donation was no longer significant (p=.094). Thus, pre-
compensatory guilt fully mediates the relationship between transgression anonymity and 
compensation.  
As in Study 1 an examination of pre-compensatory non-guilty emotions revealed 
that some emotions differed significantly by condition. Specifically, participants in the 
known transgression reported feeling more anxious, irritated, and tense and less happy 
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than those in the unknown transgression condition (All Fs>7.47, all ps<.011). Moreover, 
pre-compensatory irritation, tenseness, and anxiety were all positively significantly 
correlated with donation amount and pre-compensatory happiness was negatively 
significantly correlated with donation amount (All rs>.178). Additionally, donation 
decision and donation amount were significantly correlated with post-compensatory 
anxiety, happiness, distractability, irritability, and tenseness (All rs>.128).   
Discussion 
Study 2 sought to replicate the findings from Study 1 that guilt motivates 
subsequent compensatory behavior, and that the opportunity to engage in such behavior 
can mitigate guilt. Study 2 also sought to extend these findings by examining the 
candidate mechanisms for guilt and compensatory behavior, distinguishing between 
interpersonal and intrapersonal factors.   
As expected, Study 2 showed that compensatory behavior decreased guilt. People 
felt less guilty after compensating than those who had not yet engaged in compensatory 
behavior. Study 2 also revealed that guilt was mitigated equally in the unknown and 
known transgression tasks. Although the mitigation effect on guilt in Study 1 differed 
across conditions, the consistent mitigation effect in Study 2 may have arisen because 
guilt was high in both of the transgression scenarios. In contrast, participants in the 
neutral condition in Study 1 may not have had enough guilt in the first place to 
experience a subsequent mitigation.  
The patterns of guilt ratings suggested that those whose transgression was known 
felt more guilty than those whose transgression was unknown.  This finding was 
congruent with the interpersonal theory of guilt. Because interpersonal guilt is primarily 
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driven by the way in which others see oneself, feelings of guilt should be higher when 
others know about one‘s wrongdoings or mistakes. This pattern contrasts with the 
intrapersonal account, which holds that guilt is self-focused; if guilt was self-focused, the 
anonymity of a transgression should not have made a difference, and people whose 
transgression was unknown should have felt equally guilty as those whose transgression 
was known. 
Interestingly, the anonymity of donations did not affect guilt. This is juxtaposed 
with the finding that the anonymity of the transgression significantly affected guilt. If 
guilt is interpersonal—as the effect of transgression anonymity suggests—then 
anonymity of the donation should also make a difference, with disclosed donations 
mitigating guilt more than anonymous donations. The fact that this was not the case 
supports an alternative view of guilt, which holds that guilt is more intrapersonal, and is 
about having the transgression repaired rather than about having the transgressor 
themselves repair the wrong and preserve a relationship (de Hooge, 2012). These two 
findings—that donation anonymity did not affect guilt, while transgression anonymity 
did—are in apparent contrast to one another and require further reconciliation. Potential 
interpretation of this incongruence will be discussed further in the General Discussion.  
Donation behavior largely mirrored patterns of guilt.  In particular, anonymity of 
the donation itself did not affect the amount people chose to give.  Donations differed, 
however, based on transgression condition, such that known transgressions elicited 
greater donation than did unknown transgressions. Furthermore, the link between 
transgression condition and donation behavior was fully mediated by guilt: known 
transgressions led to greater guilt, which in turn led to greater donations. This 
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mediational effect of guilt, which was expected, suggests that guilt is not only affected by 
compensatory behavior, but also affects compensatory behavior. 
General Discussion 
Compensatory Behavior Mitigates Guilt 
 Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 indicate a relationship between guilt and 
compensatory behavior such that compensatory behavior can reduce guilty feelings. In 
both studies, guilt decreased after compensation. This is supported by previous research 
suggesting that compensatory behavior has an effect on guilt. For example, the finding 
that compensatory behavior can reduce guilty feelings is congruent with Zhong and 
Liljenquist‘s (2006) research that indicates the reduction of guilt by physical cleansing (a 
physical form of compensation).  Furthermore, the present study augments previous 
research; previous studies have suggested that guilt can motivate cooperation and 
compensation, but have not examined how this compensation subsequently affects guilt. 
Ketaleer and Au (2003) found that guilt motivated compensatory cooperation following 
previous uncooperative actions in a social bargaining game, but did not examine guilt 
post-cooperation. In the present study, recording guilt before and after compensatory 
tasks allowed for a comparison of guilt that demonstrates a decrease in guilt post-
compensation, and ultimately suggests that compensatory behavior can mitigate guilt.   
It is important to note that in Study 1 in particular, compensating decreased guilt 
even when the compensation had nothing to do with the source of guilt. Participants 
recalled a wide variety of transgressions, including hurting others, cheating on partners, 
and emotionally hurting or disappointing other family members. Yet, despite the 
irreparability of some of these transgressions, participants who recalled a transgression 
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chose to donate money to the American Cancer Society (as part of the experimental 
compensatory task) more often than those who recalled a neutral transgression. The fact 
that participants chose to donate despite this incongruency suggests that guilt may lead to 
token behavior, such that guilt motivates a compensatory behavior, but not necessarily a 
behavior equivalent to the original action.  
According to Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, and Strongman (1999), 
moral inconsistency is driven by a desire to benefit from acting selfishly while also 
maintaining one‘s moral reputation or self-worth. Thus, someone is most likely to take 
the action that allows for the greatest possible material reward while also preserving their 
reputation or self-worth. In the case of the current experiment, the only compensatory 
opportunity participants had was to engage in a minor, unrelated prosocial behavior. If 
such behavior cannot preserve one‘s self-worth, then people would not have been 
motivated to donate, as it would have done little for their self-worth or reputation and 
would have caused them to incur a cost; donating, in this case, would have caused a 
decrease in material reward while not accruing any benefit. However, given that 
participants did donate money, it is possible that minor, token prosocial behavior can 
alleviate guilt, and in this particular case, allowed the participant to both reap the benefit 
of material reward (by keeping part of the bonus) and the benefit of preserving their 
reputation or self-worth (by decreasing guilt). 
In Study 1, although people donated more often in the transgression condition, 
among people who did donate, the amount that they donated did not differ across 
condition. This may be explained by the idea that moral inconsistency is driven by a 
desire to benefit from acting selfishly while also maintaining one‘s moral reputation or 
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self-worth. It is possible that when participants did choose to donate, they were still 
donating very little, in order to keep the costs of compensating low. Given these small 
donation amounts, the actual amount that participants donated may have been based more 
on individual differences than on the transgression manipulation, as donation behavior 
can be significantly affected by the way in which personal values align with 
organizational values (Bennet, 2003). 
Guilt Affects Compensatory Behavior  
In both Study 1 and Study 2, guilt was also found to motivate compensatory 
behavior. In Study 1, pre-compensatory guilt was a significant predictor of donation 
decision, such that greater guilt predicted a greater likelihood to donate. Furthermore, 
Study 2 showed that guilt not only directly affected compensatory behavior (such that 
greater guilt led to larger donations), but also fully mediated the relationship between 
transgression anonymity and compensation. This mediation effect demonstrates that guilt 
can directly and indirectly affect compensatory behavior.  
Analysis of the correlation between compensatory behavior and post-
compensatory emotions in Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that guilt may not be unique in 
driving compensatory behavior. Several additional emotions significantly differed across 
neutral and transgression conditions, and across known and unknown transgression 
conditions in Studies 1 and 2, respectively.  
Previous examinations of moral behavior indicate that a variety of emotions affect 
moral hypocrisy by altering the judgments of one‘s own moral behavior or the judgments 
one makes of others‘ moral behavior (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). For example, Polman and 
Ruttan‘s (2012) findings that anger increased moral hypocrisy and envy reversed moral 
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hypocrisy demonstrate that emotions as a whole are crucial to understanding 
compensatory behavior. It is therefore unsurprising that the current study revealed a 
correlation between such emotions as irritation, happiness, and tension, and 
compensatory behavior.  
Past studies also indicate that guilty feelings are closely related to other emotions 
in a pattern similar to that demonstrated in the current experiment. In an experience 
sampling method, Baumeister, Reis, and Delespaul (1995) found that guilt feelings 
among adults were positively correlated with aversive arousal states and were negatively 
correlated with pleasant arousal states. In the present study, tension and irritation, which 
are negative arousal states, were higher among those in the known transgression 
condition than in the unknown transgression condition, and happiness, a positive arousal 
sate, was lower in the known transgression condition than in the unknown transgression 
condition (Haidt, 2003).  These findings are expected given the initial prediction that 
guilt would be higher among those in the known transgression condition than in the 
unknown transgression condition. In cases where guilt is thought to be negatively 
correlated, i.e., in the case of positive arousal states, positive emotions were rated  lower 
than guilt. In cases where guilt is thought to be positively correlated, i.e., in the case of 
negative arousal states, negative emotions were rated similarly to guilt. Thus, these other 
emotional findings do not necessarily weaken the relationship between guilt and 
compensatory behavior. Rather, they indicate that other emotions may be affecting 
compensatory behavior in conjunction with guilt. 
Post-compensatory guilt was similar among those who donated and those who did 
not donate. This was contrary to the hypothesis that guilt would be lower after donating. 
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However, this null effect may not rule out the possibility that compensatory behavior 
reduces guilt. It is still possible that an individual‘s decision to donate may have reduced 
their guilt, but that the between-subjects nature of the guilt measurement was unable to 
assess this possibility. 
Interpersonal or Intrapersonal?  
Findings regarding the mechanisms behind guilt and compensatory behavior were 
less clear in that although known transgressions led to higher guilt and thus higher 
compensation, the public nature of the compensatory task did not affect guilt or 
donations.  
The fact that a known transgressor both felt more guilty and donated more money 
than an anonymous transgressor seems to imply that there may be interpersonal 
mechanisms motivating guilt and compensation. According to interpersonal theory, status 
promotion, which occurs when others publicly view one‘s moral behavior, is the primary 
motivator for moral actions. Public transgressions thus create more negative feelings than 
transgressions committed without public knowledge because there is a greater 
opportunity for judgment by others (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006). In the case of the 
current experiment, those whose action was known by others may have felt guiltier and 
donated more due to this very reason.  
This evidence for interpersonal mechanisms is complicated, however, by the fact 
that anonymity of the compensation did not make a difference in guilt or donations. If the 
presence and judgments of others mattered, then there would have been an effect of 
compensation anonymity such that public donations were larger, and had a greater ability 
to mitigate guilt. Yet, findings were more in line with intrapersonal mechanisms. 
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Intrapersonal theory holds that guilt drives any reparative action that will make one feel 
better about oneself—public or private (de Hooge, 2012).  
Previous research examining non-interpersonal ways to combat guilty feelings 
suggests a way of reconciling these two findings. A study conducted by Inbar, Pizarro, 
Gilovich, and Ariely (2013) demonstrated that people will sometimes atone for 
transgressions by harming themselves. In the study, participants who recalled a guilt-
inducing event were more willing to inflict unpleasant electric shocks on themselves than 
those recalling sad or neutral events. Guilt was also subsequently decreased after 
administering the shocks. In the case of Inbar et al‘s (2013) experiment, transgressions 
induced self-harm, despite not necessarily being self-focused transgressions. It is possible 
that in the present experiment, although guilt and compensation were driven by 
interpersonal behavior, they were able to be alleviated intrapersonally.  
This idea, that guilt and compensation, while sparked by interpersonal 
mechanisms, can be alleviated by the self, is also supported by Nelissen and Zeelenberg 
(2009), who found that when opportunities for compensation are not present, guilt can 
evoke self-punishment.  Participants read a situation in which they failed exams, thus 
incurring extra costs for university on behalf of their parents. While this situation in and 
of itself was interpersonal in nature, Nelissen and Zeelenberg (2009) found that 
participants who were unable to repair the transgression (i.e., had to wait until the next 
academic year to take the course), inflicted self-punishment in the form of self-denied 
pleasure in a scenario study and inflicted self-enforced penalties.  
Nelissen and Zeelenberg‘s (2009) study has some similarities to the present study 
in that a given participant was only presented one way to repair a transgression. In the 
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present study, participants were forced to either donate anonymously or publicly. If given 
the choice, participants may have preferred to make public donations, thus providing 
evidence for the interpersonal theory of compensation and guilt. However, when only 
given one option, they may have donated equal amounts under both conditions because it 
was the only method of alleviating guilt.  
Limitations 
Hypothetical scenarios vs. recall. Although there was a strong mediation effect 
of guilt in Study 2, guilt was only a marginally significant predictor of donation amount 
(such that greater guilt led to higher donations) in Study 1. These findings may be 
explained by the difference in experimental designs across the two studies. While 
participants in Study 1 were making decisions about donating real money, Study 2 
presented an entirely hypothetical compensatory task. It is possible that it was easier for 
people to compensate in Study 2 than in Study 1, given the hypothetical nature of the 
compensation. This difference in design may explain the fact that guilt was only a partial 
predictor of compensatory behavior. Previous research has found that real moral 
decisions can contradict moral decisions made in hypothetical scenarios (Ajzen, Brown, 
& Carvajal, 2004). For example, in a study conducted by Brown, Azjen, and Hrubes 
(2003), college students voted in a referendum to contribute a certain amount of money to 
a scholarship fund in either a hypothetical or a real payment context. Votes to make 
payments above $1 were up to 48% higher in the hypothetical condition than in the real 
condition. A similar effect may have occurred in the present experiment, confounding the 
ability of guilt to predict donations. It is possible that people donated differently in Study 
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1 because real money was at stake, and there was a higher threshold of guilt necessary to 
motivate donations.  
Individual differences. One alternative explanation as to why guilt did not 
accurately predict the amount of money donated is that money itself can be very context 
dependent. In the context of Amazon Mechanical Turk, money is spare and participants 
can get paid less than $2 an hour (Harris, 2014). Thus, the 20 cent bonus allocated as a 
possible compensatory donation, may have been considered quite large, and might have 
made participants weary of donating money. Additionally, there may have been other 
factors keeping people from donating. For example, people may have had particular 
qualms about donating to the specific charity (The American Cancer Society) in Study 1. 
Previous research has shown that personal values and inclinations can powerfully 
influence where people to choose to donate (Bennet, 2003). This complicates the way in 
which donations to a particular charity can be read as indicative of emotions, rather than 
personal inclinations.   
 Congruency. While the current studies demonstrate that compensatory behavior 
alleviates guilt, the strength of this effect may have been underrepresented because of the 
incongruency between transgressions and compensatory tasks. Study 1 forced a strong 
incongruency; while participants recalled irreparable interpersonal transgressions, 
donating a small amount to charity was the only compensatory option presented. In 
contrast, Study 2, while presenting an irreparable transgression, presented a 
compensatory option more closely related to the original transgression (i.e., the donation 
was going back to the charity affected by the transgression).  
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Furthermore, this incongruence may have weakened the ability of guilt to predict 
compensatory behavior. A further investigation of behaviors elicited by guilt may help 
elucidate whether guilt is an accurate predictor of compensatory behavior overall, or if 
the link between guilt and compensatory behavior is context specific.  
Future Investigation  
Manipulating the transgression. Given the evidence supporting both 
interpersonal and intrapersonal mechanisms of guilt and compensation, these mechanisms 
may be worthy of further investigation. While the current study demonstrated that 
transgressing knowingly increases guilt, a future experiment might look at whether 
differences in familiarity with the person transgressed makes a difference. A study 
conducted by Ghorbani, Liao, Çayköylü, and Chand (2013) examining hypothetical 
ethical decisions regarding compensation towards flood victims of differing 
psychological proximity demonstrated that increased psychological proximity can 
increase guilt, shame, and compensatory behavior. In the study, participants reported the 
highest levels of guilt, shame, and compensation when a victim in an imaginative 
scenario was an in-group member, while the lowest levels of guilt, shame, and 
compensation resulted when the victim was an abstractly described stranger. If 
interpersonal mechanisms play a large role in guilt and compensation, as Ghorbani et 
al.‘s (2013) findings suggest, then one would expect to see higher guilt and more 
compensation in instances where a transgression involves a loved one than when it 
involves a stranger.  
Manipulating whether the initial transgression itself is interpersonal or 
intrapersonal may help further clarify to what extent guilt and compensatory behavior are 
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relationship-oriented. In the current studies, transgressions were interpersonal in nature. 
In Study 1, participants were specifically asked to recall a time that their actions affected 
someone else. Similarly, in Study 2, although the public nature of the transgression was 
manipulated, in all cases, deleting the data impacted the organization, and thus, people 
outside of the self.  
It is possible that interpersonal transgressions—i.e. poor decisions that negatively 
affect others rather than the self—elicit more guilt and a greater need to compensate than 
intrapersonal transgressions. Previous research examining which types of harm play a 
determining role in the experiences of guilt and regret found that guilt increased as 
interpersonal consequences became more severe (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosje, & 
Manstead, 2004). In the study, participants read a scenario in which their decision (e.g., 
choosing to go on vacation during a family member‘s anniversary) had ramifications that 
differed in the degree to which they caused self or interpersonal harm (e.g., at opposite 
ends of the spectrum: the family members do not care but the holiday goes badly, or the 
holiday goes well but the family members are disappointed). Guilt was found to increase 
as negative interpersonal consequences increased.  
In accordance with these findings, interpersonal transgressions could trigger more 
guilt than intrapersonal transgressions. Accordingly, compensatory behavior could be 
affected as well. If, as the present study suggests, guilt and compensatory behavior are 
linked, and if compensatory behavior is itself interpersonally motivated, then it is 
possible that interpersonal transgressions would elicit greater compensatory behavior as 
well.  
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 Examining a variety of transgressions may also contribute to the literature on 
compensatory behavior and guilt by indicating whether moral or conventional 
transgressions are more or less likely to evoke guilt. Previous research has suggested that 
transgressions can be categorized as either moral or conventional transgressions (Kelly, 
Stitch, & Haley, 2007). According to this distinction, moral rules, such as those 
prohibiting murder, have an objective and prescriptive force, while conventional rules, 
such as dress codes, are arbitrary and situation dependent (Kelly, Stitch, & Haley, 2007). 
According to the moral/conventional task paradigm, in which subjects are asked to judge 
examples of prototypical moral and conventional transgressions, moral transgressions are 
judged more severely across diverse age groups, nationalities, and religions (Kelly, 
Stitch, & Haley, 2007). In the current study, this distinction was not of relevance; both 
the transgression prompt and the scenario, in Studies 1 and 2 respectively, were designed 
simply to elicit guilt and examine the effect of guilt on compensatory behavior. However, 
coding responses to the transgression prompt in Study 1 based on transgression type may 
help determine if moral or conventional standards are more often associated with guilty 
feelings. It is possible that the nature of a moral transgression can either itself influence 
compensatory behavior, or may influence compensatory behavior by way of guilt, such 
that moral transgressions are more severe and thus evoke greater guilt and compensation.  
The nature of compensation. Given the current study‘s focus on monetary 
means of compensation, future investigation might look at other ways to mitigate guilt 
that are less monetarily focused. Examining other compensatory tasks can reveal the 
ways in which guilt affects different kinds of compensatory behavior and whether some 
types of compensatory behavior are more guilt-driven than others. Additionally, further 
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research can elucidate what it is about compensatory behavior that mitigates guilt and if 
directly compensating for a transgression is more or less effective at mitigating guilt than 
indirectly compensating for a transgression. More specifically, manipulating the 
congruency between transgressions and subsequent compensation can further illuminate 
the extent of compensatory behavior‘s ability to affect guilt.  In the current study, guilt 
was affected more by compensation in Study 2 than in Study 1. While study 2 offered a 
more direct way to compensate—in the form of making a donation back to the 
organization affected by the transgression—this kind of congruency did not exist in the 
first task. Thus, it is possible that the greater congruency between transgression and 
compensation, the more the compensation can mitigate guilt.  
Using a within-subjects design. Additionally, examining guilt within-subjects 
may uniquely contribute to understandings of guilt and compensatory behavior. Because 
the current study examined pre-compensatory and post-compensatory guilt between 
subjects, it is difficult to directly deduce the ways in which guilt may affect and be 
affected by compensatory behavior. Examining an individual‘s guilty feelings overtime 
may provide more information regarding how guilt fluctuations correlate to specific 
actions. In particular, looking at an individual‘s guilt at the time of a specific guilt-
inducing event, versus looking at base-level guilt, can provide insight as to the ways in 
which compensatory behavior may interact with guilt in certain contexts and over time. 
The importance of continued research. The present research indicates that there 
is, in fact, a relationship between guilt and compensatory behavior. In both studies, guilt 
was lower after donating, suggesting that compensatory behavior can mitigate guilt. 
Furthermore, guilt predicted the decision to donate in Studies 1 and 2. While the current 
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study did not offer clear evidence as to whether interpersonal or intrapersonal 
mechanisms drive guilt, the fact that the effect of transgression anonymity on donations 
was fully mediated by guilt indicates that in the case of either mechanism, guilt motivates 
subsequent compensatory behavior.  
 Continuing to examine the way in which moral emotions drive compensatory 
behavior can only further our understanding of moral inconsistency and the source of this 
enigmatic tendency. Such investigations can contribute to the greater literature regarding 
why and how we make ethical and moral decisions, shedding light on the complexities of 
human moral behavior. 
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Figure 1: Self-reported guilt in transgression and neutral conditions reported before or 
after performing a compensatory task in Study 1.  
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(A)   
(B)     
Figure 2: Self-reported guilt in known and unknown transgression conditions reported 
before or after performing a compensatory task in Study 2 in the a) known compensation 
condition b) anonymous compensation condition  
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Figure 3: Donations ($) in the known and unknown transgression and compensation 
conditions in Study 2.  
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Appendix A  
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. You will have three 
minutes to complete this portion of the questionnaire.  
 
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die, 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how 
many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?  
Number of times:  
 
2. In the Big Bucks Lottery, the changes of winning a $10 prize are 1%. What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people 
each buy a single ticket from Big Bucks?    
Number of people: (fill in the blank)  
 
3. In the Acme Publishing Sweepstakes, the change of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. 
What percent of tickets of Acme Publishing Sweepstakes win a car?  
Percent of tickets: (fill in the blank)  
 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?  
(1) 1 in 100 
(2) 1 in 1,000 
(3) 1 in 10       
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Appendix B  
(transgression) Please write about a time that you angered someone and then felt badly 
about your actions. 
 
(neutral) Please write about what you do during your average Tuesday.   
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Appendix C  
Items rated on a 7-point Likert scale from ‗not at all‘ to ‗very.‘  
Please indicate how you feel in this particular moment   
anxious 
irritated 
tense 
guilty 
distractible 
energetic 
happy 
talkative 
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Appendix D  
Scenario instructions: Please read the following scenario carefully. As you are reading, 
imagine yourself as the person in the story.  
 
(UNKNOWN Transgressor):  
 
For the last three months, you have been volunteering as a computer science intern at a non-
profit organization. You just received a $200 bonus for your hard work.  
 
Motivated to do even more work for the organization, you decide to reformat the computer‘s 
data system. Although the task is beyond your skill level, you know that updating the system 
would really help the organization. In the process of trying to reformat the data system, you 
accidentally delete the data before copying it all over, causing your organization to lose 
irreplaceable data that has been collected over the past 30 years.  
 
Since many people had access to this particular data, no one will know it was you who made 
this fatal error.  
 
(KNOWN Transgressor):  
 
For the last three months, you have been volunteering as a computer science intern at a non-
profit organization. You just received a $200 bonus for your hard work.  
 
Motivated to do even more work for the organization, you decide to reformat the computer‘s 
data system. Although the task is beyond your skill level, you know that updating the system 
would really help the organization. In the process of trying to reformat the data system, you 
accidentally delete the data before copying it all over, causing your organization to lose 
irreplaceable data that has been collected over the past 30 years.  
 
Since only you and your supervisor had access to this particular data, it will be obvious that it 
was you who made this fatal error. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guilt and Moral Compensation                   55 
 
Appendix E  
(UNKNOWN Compensatory task)  
 
Now, think back to the scenario you read. 
 
To try to make up for your mistake, you think about donating some of your $200 bonus back 
to the organization. 
 
 It is the organization's policy only to accept anonymous donations; all donations are 
published in the monthly newsletter, but without the donor's name.  
 
How much do you donate?  
 
($0, $5, $10, $20, $50, $100, $200) 
 
(KNOWN Compensatory task)  
 
Now, think back to the scenario you read. 
 
To try to make up for your mistake, you think about donating some of your $200 bonus back 
to the organization.  
 
It is the organization's policy not to accept anonymous donations; all donations are published 
in the monthly newsletter along with the donor's name.  
 
How much do you donate?  
 
($0, $5, $10, $20, $50, $100, $200) 
 
 
 
